The many myths & misconceptions of Dieppe

As with any battle – as with any human endeavor – many myths have sprung up over the years about Dieppe. The primary ones spring not only from faulty memories – a failure we all share – but from the efforts of those in charge to obscure some of the blame.

The most prevailing myth is that Dieppe served as an important precursor to D-Day. There is absolutely no evidence that it was conceived as such beforehand. True, the Allied Command did need to gain experience in planning and mounting invasions – but that experience came in much more significant landings in Africa and then Italy. The African landings (code named Torch) took place very soon after Dieppe, were on a considerably larger scale, and were far better precedents for D Day – though they are never mentioned as such.

A lesser version of that myth holds that the lessons of Dieppe were critical to the success of D-Day. While it’s certainly true that the Allied Commanders learned a few things as they went on with the war, the lessons supposedly learned at Dieppe were fairly obvious to begin with. Not even Montgomery thought that attacking head-on into the teeth of an enemy’s defenses was a particularly good strategy before Dieppe.

Another prevailing myth is that the invaders lost the element of surprise when a German convoy blundered into them, and that this doomed the mission. This at least has some elements of truth – a German convoy did blunder into part of the invasion fleet, and this accident did have an impact on the mission. But that effect was limited to Number 3 Commando and Yellow Beach, and was at least partly mitigated by the Commandos who persevered in their mission.

The action at sea disrupted the commando’s landing, making it impossible for a large number of the force to land. It was because of this that the majority of Rangers never made it to shore. The German documents indicate that the shore defenses near Berneval may have learned of the clash – but they also indicate that the units were already supposed to be on alert. Part of the unit did manage to land, and disrupted the battery they were targeting to an important extent. According to the Commando accounts, the guns were never a factor in the battle, at least until the order had been given on the main beaches to retreat.

Though it is almost never mentioned, it’s important to remember that the battle plan for the invasion called for the two Commando groups to launch their attacks ahead of the main body. There was sound tactical reasoning for this – the guns they were targeting could have blown the invading force out of the water. But it would also have been obvious to the planners that once these attacks were made the element of tactical surprise on the main beach would be lost.

And one last thing about surprise: the commanders realized that they would have only tactical surprise – as opposed to strategic surprise – for the invasion. Not only had ample propaganda about a “Second Front” alerted the Germans that something was up, but essentially the same invasion had been planned, assembled, and then called off barely a month before. The reason it had been called off – German planes spotted and attacked the fleet.

Another myth about Dieppe holds that it was the Allied answer to Stalin’s pleas for a second front. Stalin was asking for a second front, but he wasn’t so stupid to think that five thousand men and two dozen tanks were it. Nor did Churchill or Roosevelt think he was that dumb. Churchill did tell Stalin that a raid was coming, but he emphasized that it was a raid. The real answer to Stalin’s pleas was the intense air campaign against Germany – which had a much greater impact on the war than Dieppe did.

Some historians have contended that the British high command never gave direct approval for the raid, an in fact one of the survivors wrote a book calling it an unauthorized action. The evidence, however, is clear that the raid was encouraged from the highest levels. It boggles the mind to think that the amount of resources involved could have been mobilized without approval.

One reason that this myth has currency is Montgomery’s attempt to distance himself from the raid, especially after the war. He was able to get away with this partly because he was reassigned before the raid took place, and because of his reputation as a great general. Unfortunately for him, the record shows that he presided over the meetings where it was discussed, meetings which included full reports on the navy’s reluctance to supply capital ships to bombard the defenses – a critical flaw in the plan that he later claimed he was unaware of.

Finally, the operation’s failure is often blamed on poor intelligence. It is true that there were intelligence failures – the wrong unit was identified as defending the area. But the basic defenses were fairly accurately depicted, thanks to air reconnaissance. If there was a failure in intelligence, it was the planners’ somewhat naïve assumption that the defenders wouldn’t put up much of fight – and that their untried forces could match units that not only were defending well-thought out positions, but had already seen some combat.

Dieppe was a fiasco for many reasons, but the main blame has to fall on the generals and their staffs that planned the assault. From Combined Operations to the Canadian divisional planners, unrealistic expectations and what can only be described as magical thinking prevailed during the planning. There was also clearly an ethos among the British that heavy casualties during a Commando operation were acceptable (though of course regrettable), so long as the major goal was achieved. The major goal was not tactical, but strategic: keeping the Germans off balance in Europe, and, even more importantly, showing the people back home that the fight was still on. The great tragedy of Dieppe was that this ethos was adopted for a force far better suited for conventional warfare, and was far too inexperienced to have had a good chance at victory even if the conditions had been better.

In the end, Dieppe wasn’t worth the price paid by so many men, and it never would have been worth it, even if the tactical objective had been achieved.

- Jim DeFelice